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MITCHELL V HELMS AND THE MODERN
CULTURAL ASSAULT ON THE SEPARATION
OF CHURCH AND STATE
DEREK H. DAVIS*
Abstract: This Article suggests that the Mitchell v. Helms decision, and
the course on which its sets us—offering government aid to religion as a
social good—is a blunder that will have serious adverse consequences
for the vital role that religion plays in American society. The intention
of aiding religion through the beneficent emasculation of traditional
tests of government establishment observed in Helms is just the latest
instance of our recurrent attempts to kill American religion with
kindness. This process is spurred on by a perceived national crisis
following tragedies like those in Paducah, Kentucky and Littleton,
Colorado. This Article suggests that while the United States has largely
resisted the temptation to alter the inherent wisdom of the system,
recent political and judicial changes make the First Amendment and
American religious groups that depend on it more vulnerable.
INTRODUCTION
Never before in U.S. history has there been so much attention
paid to relieving the supposed malaise enveloping the nation's
schools. Politicians, religious leaders, academics, even eccentric indus-
try moguls have offered countless proposals aimed at correcting vari-
ous maladies that have crept into the once vibrant American educa-
tional system, the institutions of which now often are portrayed as
violent, underfunded detention centers for the nation's youth.'
Tragedies on public school campuses like those that occurred in
Paducah, Kentucky and Littleton, Colorado have generated a sense of
* Derek H. Davis (BA, J.D., MA, Baylor University; Ph.D., University of Texas at Dal-
las) is Professor of Political Science and Director of the J.M. Dawson Institute of Church-
State Studies, Baylor University, and Editor of Journal of Church and State, He is the author,
editor, or coeditor of thirteen books, including RELIGION AND THE CONTINENTAL CON-
GRESS, 1774-1789: CONTRIBUTIONS TO ORIGINAL INTENT (2000). He acknowledges his
appreciation to Chuck McDaniel, a doctoral graduate in Church-State Studies at Baylor
University, for assistance in the preparation of this Article.
I See Stacey Pamela Patton, Providing Education Alternatives; Special Scholarship Fund Gives
Low-Income Families A Shot at Ptivate Schooling, WASH. POST, Aug. 17, 2000, at J8,
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desperation throughout the country. The nation particularly was stag-
gered by the magnitude of the crime at Columbine High School in
Littleton where, on April 20, 1999, classmates Eric Harris and Dylan
Klebold executed twelve fellow students and one teacher and left
twenty-three wounded before taking their own lives.2 In the weeks and
months after Columbine, articles appeared in American religious
journals, as Christian and other spiritual leaders voiced their percep-
tion of the carnage as yet another example of American moral decay
centered at the very heart of the nation—the public school system.
Even advertisements in these journals addressed the tragedy. An ad in
the October, 2000 issue of Citizen, the journal of the conservative
Christian group Focus on the Family, was entitled "After Columbine
What Will You Do?" and began with the statement "On November 17,
1980, the U.S. Supreme Court ordered the Ten Commandments out
of schools," with the obvious implication that the Court's Stone tt
Graham decision to which it referred was a contributory factor in the
Columbine tragedy. Conservative religious groups, convinced of the
connection between Supreme Court decisions and school violence,
have set about once again to find ways in which to gain official sanc-
tion for the "return" of religious practice to public school classrooms. 4
There is activity on other fronts as well.
Constitutional prohibitions on returning religious exercises to
public schools have led many to private school alternatives. Religious
schools in particular, without constitutional impediments to sectarian
religious activities, increasingly are perceived by some to be the an-
swer to the so-called moral vacuum that plagues the public schools. 5
But religious schools often are woefully underfunded, lacking the
money to adequately compensate teachers and the capital necessary
to stock their institutions with equipment and materials comparable
2 See Swastika Graffiti Greet Students Going Back to Columbine High, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18,
1999, at A22.
3 Advertisement: After Columbine What Will You Do? 14 CITIZEN 29, 29 (2000). Stone te
Graham involved a Kentucky state law that mandated that a copy of the Ten Command-
ments be posted in all public school classrooms. 449 U.S. 39, 39 (1980). The Supreme
Court there determined that the law was plainly religious and lacked any secular purpose
and was, therefore, unconstitutional. Id. at 41, 43.
4 See Mark G. Valencia, Take Care of Me When I am Dead: An Examination of American
Church-State Development and the Future of American Religious Liberty, 49 SMU L. REV. 1579,
1632 (1996).
5 See, e.g., Joseph I. Lieberman, "Revolt of the Revolted - Revisited: America's Values Vacuum
and What to Do About It, 35 HARv. J. on LEGIS. 51, 54-55 (1998).
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to their public school counterparts. 6
 This state of affairs has lent sup-
port to legislative efforts to provide government aid to private relig-
ious schools via vouchers and other instruments. In concert with these
legislative maneuvers, the United States Supreme Court's recent
Mitchell v. Helms decision erodes constitutional prohibitions against
government aid to religious schools by dismantling prior tests that
were developed to determine Establishment Clause violations.? The
plurality opinion in Helms amplifies the call for a religious booster
shot as a solution to the nation's perceived moral decline and the
melancholy in American schools, both public and private.8
Public fear in the wake of tragedies like Columbine and public
frustration over the inadequate funding of American private schools
have begun to soften our nation on one of its founding principles—
the separation of church and state. For many this "softening" is a wel-
comed change. Advocates of the so-called "equal treatment" of paro-
chial education have been heartened by the Helms decision, contend-
ing that the separationist policies of government historically have
harmed private religious schools by denying them access to resources
that otherwise would be at their disposal were those schools not relig-
iously affiliated. Carl Esbeck states that "Rio increasing numbers of
Americans, strict separation presents a cruel choice between suffering
funding discrimination or forced secularization." 8
 These supposed
coercive and discriminatory elements of church-state separation are
common arguments among those favoring greater governmental ac-
commodation of religious institutions of all kinds." As this Article will
show, however, the evidence proves that church-state separation has
served to benefit rather than harm American religious vitality." Fur-
thermore, this Article will demonstrate that attempts to alleviate the
alleged "harm" of separation inevitably involve the forfeiture of relig-
See, e.g., Kim L. Hooper, Historic St. Rita School to Claw; Dwindling Enrollment Forces Dio-
cese to Merge the Black Elementary with St. Andrew School, INDIANAPOLIS STAR, June 21, 2002 at
1B.
7 See 530 U.S. 793, 835-36 (2000).
8
 See generally id, at 801-36.
9
 Carl H. Esbeck, Equal Treatment: Its Constitutional Status, in EQUAL TREATMENT OF RE-
LIGION IN A PLURALISTIC SOCIETY 9, 13 (Stephen V. Monsma & J. Christopher Soper eds.,
1998).
10
 Advocates of other governmental assistance programs such as Charitable Choice,
which provides government funds and other resources to the social service organizations
of religious groups, also employ this argument about the perceived discriminatory conse-
quences of separation. For a more complete treatment of this topic, see WELFARE REFORM
AND FAITH-BASED ORGANIZATIONS (Derek Davis & Barry Hankins eds., 1990).
See infra notes 161-178 and accompanying text.
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ion's sacred space under the First Amendment and the ultimate deni-
gration of religious institutions to the status of social service organiza-
tions. 12 This Article will show how the ostensibly benign intent of bu-
reaucrats to subsidize our parochial schools only can lead to
irresolvable complexity and the despiritualization of religious organi-
zations—organizations upon which we depend as cultural counter-
weights to the often morally deficient bureaucracies of secular soci-
ety. 15
The arguments set forth in this Article undoubtedly will appear
to some as melodrama. Many may ask how simply altering our course
from a system of church-state separation to government accommoda-
tion of religion could possibly reconstitute our nation in such a way as
to cause it injury. Nonetheless, government's best intentions often
result in its greatest blunders. It will be suggested here that Helms and
the course on which it sets us—offering government aid to religion as
a social good—is a blunder that will have serious adverse conse-
quences for the vital role that religion plays in American society.' 4
Before one can comprehend the potential damage to American
religious vitality caused by government benevolence, one first must
recognize that the durability of a nation's spirit is conditioned heavily
on the maintenance of separation between its two dominant institu-
tional forms—the political and the religious. Baron de Montesquieu,
recognizing the horrors of the church-state monism of eighteenth-
century France, observed that the way to kill the vitality of religion is
through government "favor."15 Similarly, Alexis de Tocqueville, having
surveyed the American cultural landscape a century later, expressed
his insight that "[s]c) long as a religion derives its strength from sen-
timents, instincts, and passions . . . it can brave the assaults of time;"
however, "when a religion chooses to rely on the interests of this
world, it becomes almost as fragile as all earthly powers."16 For de
Tocqueville, it was no coincidence that it is in America "where the
Christian religion has kept the greatest real power over men's souls." 17
The potential damage of Helms to the preservation of the uniquely
12 See infra notes 116-160 and accompanying text.
13 See infra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
14 See infra notes 161-178 and accompanying text.
13 See Christopher L. Eisgruber, Madison's. Wager: Religious Liberty in the Constitutional Or-
der, 89 Nw. U. L. REV. 347,384 11.133 (1995).
16 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 298 (George Lawrence trans., J.P.
Mayer ed., 1969).
17 Id. at 291.
2002]	 Separation of Church and State After Mitchell v. Helms
	 1039
American ethos observed by de Tocqueville and others only can be
discerned by recognizing that the American constitutional system is
uniquely susceptible to institutional subtleties, especially those that
attempt to benefit religion through favor." It is considerably ironic
that the American church-state structure is able to withstand sledge-
hammer assaults like the great cultural schisms precipitated during
the Civil and Vietnam Wars and the official attacks on liberal and
pacifist denominations during the McCarthy era. 19 Yet, in marked
contrast to this resiliency, there is vulnerability to the American system
and to all church-state systems in modern pluralistic societies. That
vulnerability is perhaps best illustrated by the church-state partner-
ships of modern Europe, where statistics on religious belief and prac-
tice reflect a pale religiosity even though religion is given "equal
treatment," as compared to the United States with its tradition of
church-state separation. 2') This essay will analyze those systems and
attempt to discern what may be learned from the experience of other
modern industrialized and pluralistic societies."
The intention of aiding religion through the beneficent emascu-
lation of traditional tests of government establishment observed in
Helms is just the latest instance of our recurrent attempts to kill
American religion with kindness.22
 Perceived national crises often
precipitate these calls for constitutional adjustment. To date, our na-
tion largely has resisted the temptation to alter the inherent wisdom
of our system. However, recent political and judicial changes make
the First Amendment and the American religious groups that depend
on it more vulnerable to manipulation than we have ever witnessed in
our lifetimes. The plurality opinion in Helms serves as perhaps the
boldest challenge yet to the traditional American understanding of
the appropriate relationship between church and state."
18 See IS at 290-94.
19
 Robert S. Ellwood contends that McCarthyism not only attempted to subvert
churches supposedly sympathetic to communism but tried to establish "an anticommunist
state church." ROBERT S. ELLWOOD, THE FIFTIES SPIRITUAL MARKETPLACE: AMERICAN RE-
LIGION IN A DECADE OF CONFLICT 27 (1997).
" See infra notes 161-178 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 161-178 and accompanying text.
Is 530 U.S. at 835-36.
" See id. at 801-36.
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I. MITCHELL V. HELMS
One might suggest that Mitchell u Helms is merely another wind-
ing curve in the Supreme Court's meandering journey, as seen in its
complex set of government-aid-to-religion cases. 24 Indeed, scholars
have been keen to observe the lack of consistency in the Court's deci-
sions and even have noted inconsistencies among the opinions of the
Justices themselves. For example, William Lee Miller, in The First Lib-
erty: Religion and the American Republic, characterized the unpredictabil-
ity of Justice William 0. Douglas's opinions in church-state cases as
resembling "the homeward journey of a New Year's Eve reveler."26 In
fact, the Court never has established an absolute separation between
church and state in cases involving government aid to church-related
schools. In 1930, in Cochran v. Louisiana State Board of Education, the
Court determined that a state could provide secular textbooks to pa-
rochial school students directly so long as it avoided providing aid to
the religious schools themselves. 26 This model for government aid to
religious schools became known as the "child benefit theory" and has
served the Supreme Court well, even though Helms now threatens to
render it obsolete.27
Similar decisions allowing various forms of governmental aid in-
clude the famous Everson v. Board of Education that incorporated the
Establishment Clause and that, in spite of its "high wall" separationist
language, allowed public school districts to provide transportation to
children attending private religious schools. 28 Everson provides an in-
teresting contrast to Helms observed in the wording of the respective
opinions by which these and all church-state cases illumine a particu-
lar Court's disposition toward the First Amendment." In Everson„ the
Court recognized that its ruling in favor of a public program provid-
ing transportation to children attending religious schools might be
misinterpreted as a blanket endorsement of all government aid not
only to the students of religious schools but to the schools them-
24 See generally 530 U.S. 793 (2000).
23 WILLIAM LEE MILLER, THE FIRST LIBERTY: RELIGION AND THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
303 (1986).
" 281 U.S. 370,375 (1930).
v See Ellen M. Wasilausky, SeeJane Read the Bible: Does the Establishment Clause Allow School
Choice Programs to Include Sectarian Schools After Agostini v. Felton 7,56 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
721,752-53 (1999).
22 330 U.S. 1, 15-16, 17 (1947).
29 Compare id. at 15-16, with Helms, 530 U.S. at 835-36.
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selves." To make clear the true intention of the Court, Justice Black
gave perhaps the most detailed, though some would claim erroneous,
description of the First Amendment ever written by a member of the
United States Supreme Court:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amend-
ment means at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can set up a church. Neither can pass laws
which aid one religion, aid all religions, or prefer one relig-
ion over another. Neither can force nor influence a person
to go to or to remain away from church against his will or
force him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No
person can be punished for entertaining or professing relig-
ious beliefs or disbeliefs, for church attendance or non-
attendance. No tax in any amount, large or small, can be lev-
ied to support any religious activities or institutions, what-
ever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal
Government can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs
of any religious organizations or groups and vice versa. In the
words of Jefferson, the clause against establishment of relig-
ion by law was intended to erect "a wall of separation be-
tween church and State."31
Thus the Everson decision, while upholding the constitutionality of the
New Jersey program that provided public transportation to parochial
school students, reinforced clearly its interpretation of the First
Amendment as providing for a "wall of separation" between church
and state. 32
Whereas the Everson decision appears fearful of misinterpreta-
tion, the plurality decision in Helms is fearless, even reckless, in at-
tempting to strike down principles that have guided church-state ju-
risprudence for the past five decades." Helms involved Chapter 2 of
the Education Consolidation and Improvement Act of 1981 that en-
abled federal funds to go to state and local education agencies that in
turn lend educational materials and equipment to public and private
elementary and secondary schools to implement "secular, neutral,
3° See Everson, 330 U.S. at 1'7-18.
31
 Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 195,164 (1878)).
32 id. at 15-16,17.
33
 Compare id„ with Helms, 530 U.S. at 835-36.
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and nonideological" programs." The case focused specifically on the
distribution of Chapter 2 materials and equipment in Jefferson Par-
ish, Louisiana, including library books, computers, video equipment,
laboratory instruments and other resources. 35 Approximately thirty
percent of the Chapter 2 funds allocated in Jefferson Parish went to
private schools, and, in the fiscal year 1986-1987, forty-six private
schools participated in the program, forty-one of which were relig-
iously affiliated." The plurality opinion, authored by Justice Clarence
Thomas, relied heavily on the establishment tests articulated in Agos-
tini u Felton in affirming the constitutionality of the Chapter 2 pro-
gram.37 The members of the plurality (Justices Thomas, Scalia, Ken-
nedy, and Rehnquist) contended that Agostini "brought some clarity
to our case law" by collapsing the three-prong Lemon test that assessed
whether a statute: 1) has a secular purpose; 2) has the primary effect
of advancing or inhibiting religion; or 3) creates an excessive entan-
glement between government and religion; into a simpler two-part
test that evaluates whether a statute results in religious indoctrination
or defines its recipients by reference to religion." Echoing Agostini,
,the members of the Helms plurality determined that "Chapter 2 does
not result in governmental indoctrination, because it determines eli-
gibility for aid neutrally, allocates that aid based on the private choices
of the parents of schoolchildren, and does not provide aid that has an
impermissible content. Nor does Chapter 2 define its recipients by
reference to religion.""
The plurality opinion in Helms is unique, however, not in its de-
termination that a government aid program that includes religious
schools is constitutional, but for its sweeping rejection of past tests of
34 530 U.S. at 801-03.
33 Id. at 803.
36 Id Of the forty-one private religious schools participating in the program, thirty-
four were Roman Catholic. Id
37 See id, at 807-15. Agustin u Felton involved Title I of the Elementary and Secondary
Education Act of 1965 that entitled all educationally and economically disadvantaged chil-
dren in public or private schools to publicly funded remedial education services. 521 U.S.
203,209-10 (1997). The Court there held that the Title I program was constitutional and
rejected three prior criteria for evaluating such cases: (1) permitting public employees to
work within religious schools inevitably results in the state-sponsored indoctrination of
religion; (2) permitting public employees to work within religious schools necessarily con-
stitutes a symbolic union between church and state; and (3) any government aid that en-
hances the educational function of religious schools violates the separation between
church and state. Id. at 223-30,234-35.
"Helms, 530 U.S. at 807.
39 Id at 829.
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government establishment and its almost exclusive reliance on the
principle of "neutrality" as a constitutional determinant." One of the
past criteria that the plurality opinion attempts to eliminate is the so-
called "direct/indirect" distinction that determines violations of the
Establishment Clause based on the nature of the recipients of gov-
ernment aid.41
 Under this assessment, if a sectarian institution
benefits "directly" from a government program, that program is un-
constitutional." By contrast, if a student at a religious school directly
receives a government benefit and the school that the student attends
benefits only indirectly, the program is constitutional according to the
direct/indirect criterion." The plurality in Helms, however, insists that
this test, which the Court reaffirmed in Grand Rapids School District v.
Bag merely attempts to prevent the "subsidization" of religion and
that recent cases like Agostini better address the same issues through
the principles of "neutrality" and "private choice."'" According to the
opinion, "ME' aid to schools, even 'direct aid,' is neutrally available
and, before reaching or benefiting any religious school, first passes
through the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citi-
zens who are free to direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not
provided any 'support of religion' ...."45
Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion criticizes the plurality for
its rejection of the "direct/indirect" distinction as a criterion for the
determination of government establishment of religion." O'Connor
notes the plurality's use of Witters v. Washington Department of Services
for the Blind and Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District to substantiate
its claim that the direct/indirect principle effectively has been re-
placed by the broader conceptual criterion of "private choice."47 Yet,
4° See id. at 809.
Id. at 815-20.
42
 Id. at 816.
4° Helms, 530 U.S. at 816.
" Id. Grand Rapids School District v. Ball involved a Michigan shared time program in
which public school teachers were employed by private religious schools to teach secular
subjects on a part-time basis. 473 U.S. 373, 375 (1985). The Supreme Court found this
practice unconstitutional, citing the sectarian environment and effective subsidization of
religious schools. Id. at 397-98.
44
 Helms, 530 U.S. at 816 (citing Witters v. Wash. Dep't of Servs. for the Blind„ 474 U.S.
481, 488-89 (1986) (stating In] or does the mere circumstance that petitioner has chosen
to use neutrally available state aid to help pay for his religious education confer any mes-
sage of state endorsement of religion.")) .
46 Id. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
47 Id. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (citing Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills Sch. Dist.,
509 U.S. 1, 10 (1993); Witters, 474 U.S. at 487).
1044	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:1035
Justice O'Connor observes that "we decided Witters and Zobrest on the
understanding that the aid was provided directly to the individual
student who, in turn, made the choice of where to put that aid to
use."45 Indeed, Justice Rehnquist, who authored the Zobrest opinion,
was careful to distinguish as impermissible those "direct grants of gov-
ernment aid" that "relieved sectarian schools of costs they otherwise
would have borne in educating their students." 49 How is it that Justice
Rehnquist now joins the plurality in Helms in concluding that direct
government aid to a religious institution may be constitutionally per-
imissible?5° Perhaps the answer is found in the rather odd parentheti-
cal comment in the plurality opinion that if aid "first passes through
the hands (literally or figuratively) of numerous private citizens who
are free to direct the aid elsewhere, the government has not provided
any 'support of religion' . ."51 It seems that this figurative passing of
aid through the hands of private citizens greatly broadens the reach
of the private choice principle and, thus, makes the direct/indirect
test less relevant to constitutional inquiry. 52 Justice Thomas's opinion
effectively extends the concept of private choice to include not only
the choices of individual students, but also the choices of the adminis-
trators of sectarian institutions who make expenditure decisions un-
der the Chapter 2 program. 55 One wishes that the plurality had pro-
vided a few examples of how government aid might figuratively pass
through the hands of private citizens so as to better understand the
nature and scope of the plurality's private choice criterion. 54 Regard-
less, the emergence of the private choice test suggests a more permis-
sive attitude by the Court in government-aid-to-religion cases. 55 This
test undoubtedly will broaden the reach of government in its interac-
tions with religious groups as compared to the more restrictive di-
rect/indirect distinction 56
A few opening lines from Justice O'Connor's concurring opinion
in Helms testify more generally to the plurality's radical broadening of
government establishment tests:
45 Helms, 530 U.S. at 841 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
49 509 U.S. at 12.
5° See Helms, 530 U.S. at 835-36.
51 Id. at 816.
as See id.
68 See id.
54 See id.
" See Helms, 530 U.S. at 816.
58 See id. at 815-20.
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I write separately because, in my view, the plurality an-
nounces a rule of unprecedented breadth for the evaluation
of Establishment Clause challenges to government school
aid programs. Reduced to its essentials, the plurality's rule
states that government aid to religious schools does not have
the effect of advancing religion so long as the aid is offered
on a neutral basis and the aid is secular in content. The plu-
rality also rejects the distinction between direct and indirect
aid, and holds that the actual diversion of secular aid by a re-
ligious school to the advancement of its religious mission is
permissible.57
Justice O'Connor's observation of the plurality's rejection of the di-
vertibility of funds as a constitutional issue undoubtedly is based on a
comment in the plurality opinion that "the evidence of actual diver-
sion and the weakness of the safeguards against actual diversion are
not relevant to the constitutional inquiry ...." 95
 Justice O'Connor
noted that in Bowen v. Kendrick the Court determined that actual di-
version of government funds is not permitted under the Constitution;
yet, the plurality in Helms insists that divertibility of aid as an estab-
lishment test is "unworkable."59 The plurality rejects the divertibility
test because it is "boundless—enveloping all aid, no matter how triv-
ial—and thus has only the most attenuated (if any) link to realistic
concern for preventing an 'establishment of religion.' Presumably, for
example, government-provided lecterns, chalk, crayons, pens, paper,
and paintbrushes would have to be excluded from religious schools
under respondents' proposed rule."6° These comments suggest that
the plurality seeks to elevate a test of triviality above one of content.61 In
other words, direct government aid to a religious school or other in-
stitution—even if that aid is used for religious purposes—seems now
to be permissible so long as it is a trivial part of overall operations. 62
Comments in the opinion also reveal the plurality's discomfort with
using divertibility as a test in government-aid-to-religion cases because
almost any resource supplied by government is, in a sense, diverti-
ble.65
 The plurality states that "any aid, with or without content, is 'di-
57 Id. at 837 (0`Connord., concurring).
58 /d. at 834.
" Id. at 820; see id. at 840 (O'Connord., concurring).
88 Helms, 530 U.S. at 824.
51 See id.
62 See id.
65 See id.
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vertible' in the sense that it allows schools to 'divert' resources."t Yet,
this understanding that all aid is divertible was a primary motivation
behind the construction and use of the "direct/indirect" test of gov-
ernment establishment that the plurality now discards as so much
baggage.68 The plurality sees the potential diversion of aid after dis-
bursement to religious institutions as beyond the government's pur-
view and, therefore, of no consequence to constitutional inquiry.66
After Helms, determining whether government aid is channeled to
religious purposes now rests solely within the discretion of recipient
institutions' administrators.67
Not content with its effective eradication of the direct/indirect
distinction and the divertibility principle, the plurality next takes aim
at the "pervasively sectarian" test as a determinant of Establishment
Clause violations.68 The opinion acknowledges that there was a period
in which the pervasively sectarian nature of institutions aided by gov-
ernment programs was a consideration; however, "that period is one
that the Court should regret, and it is thankfully long past." 69 The
plurality states that "its relevance in our precedents is in sharp de-
cline" and that the Court's upholding of aid to sectarian schools in
Z,obrest and Agostini established new precedents that now obviate the
need for determination of sectarian status of recipient organiza-
tions." More ominously, the opinion articulates another reason for
dispensing with the pervasively sectarian principle in that "the relig-
ious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitutional
analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the government's
secular purpose."71 The above comment should strike fear in the
hearts of accommodationists and separationists alike in that it seems
to reveal an Erastian (subordination of church to state interests) dis-
64 Id.
115 See Louis R. Cohen, Historic Preservation Grants and the Establishment Clause, SG040
A.L.I.-A.BA. 721, 735 (2001).
66 See Helms, 530 U.S. at 834.
67 See id.
" See id. at 826. The pervasively sectarian nature of the recipient institution was used
as a criterion to distinguish an unconstitutional aid to religion program in Meek u Pittinger,
421 U. S. 349 (1975), from a similar Ohio plan reviewed in Wolman n Walter, 433 U.S. 229
(1977), where the services provided were found to be constitutional because they were
performed away from the "pervasively sectarian atmosphere of the church-related school."
Helms, 530 U.S. at 247.
69 Helms, 530 U.S. at 826.
70 Id. at 826-27.
71 Id. at 827.
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position of the modern Court in its church-state philosophy." Finally,
the plurality opinion suggests that the origin of the pervasively sectar-
ian principle is rooted in the nation's ignominious history of anti-
Catholicism, referencing the near passage of the Blaine Amendment
in the 1870s, which would have denied government aid to any sectar-
ian group, and Hunt v. McNair as evidence to support its claim."
The plurality's divide and conquer approach toward dismantling
past establishment tests denies any synergistic quality to the function-
ing of those tests in determining Establishment Clause violations. 74 No
criterion the plurality now attempts to jettison ever functioned inde-
pendently of the others. The plurality employs a form of reductionism
in breaking off piece-parts and attacking them by using equally small
fragments of prior decisions." Almost any Supreme Court test is sus-
ceptible to this style of attack; although Helms seems to be an extreme
concentration of this technique." The result is that the di-
rect/indirect, divertibility, and pervasively sectarian principles are vir-
tually eradicated in one fell swoop.77
The plurality's methods and comments in Helms demonstrate, if
not hostility to, then certainly a laxity toward the First Amendment by
four justices and reinforces the perception that a radical new attitude
is taking shape on the Supreme Court regarding Establishment
Clause jurisprudence." Justice O'Connor observes not only the plu-
rality's dismissal of past establishment tests but the radical elevation of
neutrality that "comes close to assigning [neutrality] singular impor-
tance in the future adjudication of Establishment Clause challenges to
government school aid programs." Further, Justice O'Connor per-
ceives the plurality's overextension in its attempts to wipe out past es-
tablishment tests in favor of its affection for neutrality. 80 Justice
O'Connor states that "the plurality's approval of actual diversion of
75 See id.
75 Id at 828-29. In Hunt u McNair, the Court upheld a general revenue bond program
excluding from participation facilities used for religious purposes. 413 U.S. 734, 736
(1973).
74 See Helms, 530 U.S. at 807-29.
75 See id
75 See id,
77 See id.
78 See generally 530 U.S. at 801-36.
79 Helms, 530 U.S. at 837 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
89 See id. at 837-39 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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government aid to religious indoctrination is in tension with our
precedents and, in any case, unnecessary to decide the instant case.""
The sweeping nature of the plurality opinion in Helms implies
more than simple dissatisfaction with prior methods in deciding First
Amendment cases.82 Justice O'Connor is correct that implementation
of the neutrality principle did not necessitate the abolishment of prior
tests." Indeed, the elimination of tests such as divertibility radically
conditions the nature of the neutrality that the plurality now es-
pouses." Absent an obligation to monitor the ultimate use of gov-
ernment aid by religious institutions, how can government agencies,
or the courts for that matter, be certain that the First Amendment is
not being violated in programs administered under the neutrality
principle? Or, has the Supreme Court's attitude shifted so much that
it no longer cares whether government funds are diverted to religious
purposes?85 If so, it is ironic that the most conservative members of
the Supreme Court are now supportive of a neutrality principle that
makes government accountable only for neutral allocations and re-
cipients' initial assurances that aid will not be used for religious pur-
poses.86
Three justices of the Supreme Court conclude that the integrity
of the First Amendment cannot be assured in government-aid-to-
religion programs by merely applying a neutrality principle in the ab-
sence of some system to monitor the ultimate use of disbursements. 87
Justice David Souter, joined by Justices Stevens and Ginsburg in dis-
sent, cited superficiality as the prime flaw in the plurality's neutrality
principle:
Hence, if we looked no further than evenhandedness, and
failed to ask what activities the aid might support, or in fact
did support, religious schools could be blessed with govern-
ment funding as massive as expenditures made for the
benefit of their public school counterparts, and religious
missions would thrive on public money. This is why the con-
sideration of less than universal neutrality has never been
recognized as dispositive and has always been teamed with
ei Id. at 837-38 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
as See generally id. at 801-36.
83 See id. at 837-44 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
84 See Helms, 530 U.S. at 820-25.
" See id.
88 See generally id. at 801-36.
87 See id. at 867-69 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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attention to other facts bearing on the substantive prohibi-
tion of support for a school's religious objective. 88
Justice Souter's statement keenly recognizes the inherent contradic-
tion in the system the plurality now advocates: the greater the success
of such neutrality-based programs in the absence of other safeguards,
the more dependent religious schools will become on government
favor.89
 Even critics of government-aid-to-religion programs like this
author initially tend to view such programs as supplemental to the
overall funding of parochial institutions. 90
 Yet, Justice Souter rightly
suggests what is not readily apparent—that because programs ena-
bling direct government aid to religious schools now have been con-
stitutionally legitimized, the absence of controls to limit their growth
likely means a linear progression of government funds as a percent-
age of the overall funding of religious institutions that take part in
such programs. 91
 It is important also to recognize that the neutrality
principle will likely extend beyond programs involving only church-
related schools. Neutrality undoubtedly will become this Court's man-
tra for deciding the constitutionality of government aid to all types of
religious institutions. Social service programs promoting the
interoperability of government and religious groups under the
classification of "Charitable Choice" assuredly will become subject to
this minimal criteria as well. The expansion of such programs in the
absence of controls will engender greater institutional interoperability
and dependency, subject recipient institutions to increasing govern-
mental oversight, and thereby begin to quash the independent spirit
from the religious groups upon which society depends to counter
relatively soulless government bureaucracies.
As government subsidization of religion grows via such neutral
distribution programs, religion necessarily will lose its autonomy and,
to some degree, its religious identity. This loss of autonomy by partici-
pant groups will result not from the specific intentions of government
agencies but rather from the quite normal operations of any bureau-
cratic arrangement in which one organization becomes dependent
upon another for funding. The assurances of politicians that govern-
ment will limit its oversight in such programs to the simple guarantee
Id. at 885 (Souter,J., dissenting).
" See Helms, 530 U.S. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting).
9° See, e.g., David S. Perron, Finding Direction in Indirection: The Direct/Indirect Aid Distinc-
tion in Establishment Clause Jurisprudence, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1233, 1236 (2000).
91
 See Helms, 530 U.S. at 885 (Souter, J., dissenting).
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of neutral disbursement can be of no comfort to those advocating re-
sponsible government. If politicians are able to keep their word and
government is so limited, the potential misuse of government aid is
obvious in a system with no means of monitoring the ultimate use of
such resources. This perhaps best describes the desired outcome in
the disbursement of Chapter 2 funds addressed in Helms.92 Alterna-
tively, if politicians are not able to keep their word and government
oversight of aid distributed to religious groups is accomplished
through audit and other invasive functions, even the advocates of
neutrality theory should recognize that such programs would be con-
stitutionally impermissible. In the one instance, the formal neutrality
favored by the plurality in Helms inevitably leads to irresponsible gov-
ernment while, in the other instance, First Amendment violations are
inevitable."
II. MISSING THE MARK: NEUTRALITY AND THE
REORDERING OF DISCRIMINATION
It is debatable whether these dangerous alterations to the Ameri-
can church-state structure will achieve their desired objective—the
elimination of discrimination against religious groups. In fact, it can
be strongly argued that the greatest flaw in neutrality programs like
the one given constitutional sanction in Mitchell n Helms is that they
simply miss their stated target." Rather than achieving their purpose
of eliminating discrimination against religious groups they merely re-
arrange the nature of discrimination, often in favor of majority relig-
ions or those groups predisposed to receiving government subsidy.
Consider the case of the Jehovah's Witnesses, for example. The Wit-
nesses' denial of the legitimacy of the state and their prohibitions on
the involvement of their membership in government activities gener-
ally restrict their participation in programs now permitted under the
Court's neutrality principle. However, advocates of neutrality might
argue that such exclusions are rare, self-imposed, and result from un-
coerced acts of conviction. Yet, these arguments simply do not hold.
First, to address the supposition of rarity, it should be restated
that there will be no constitutional means of limiting the scope of the
neutrality principle to programs providing government aid to church-
92 See generally id. at 793.
93 Sae id. at 801-36.
94 See 530 U.S. 793, 827 (2000).
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related schools.95
 This means, therefore, that religious participation in
government aid programs is not a dichotomous variable. Rather than
simply identifying those religious groups that would and would not
participate in school-aid programs, one might envision a continuum
of religious participation in government aid programs across the full
spectra of social services. This hypothetical continuum could be con-
structed using the stated positions of American churches regarding
Charitable Choice and other programs advocating church-state part-
nerships. A broad range of social services inevitably will be opened up
to potential church-state ventures under the neutrality principle. Re-
ligious groups that would fall on the "high participation" end of the
continuum likely would include the Eastern Orthodox and Roman
Catholic churches, while mainline Protestants and certain minority
faiths like the Jehovah's Witnesses would be placed on the "low par-
ticipation" end. Certain evangelical Christian groups that have moved
away from their separationist traditions would fall somewhere in the
middle of this hypothetical continuum. Churches undoubtedly will
pick and choose to participate in those government programs that are
consistent with their beliefs and practices. Roman Catholics would
participate heavily in aid to religious education programs but might
reject participation in a program that provides funding to churches to
provide certain family planning services. Jehovah's Witnesses and
Seventh-day Adventists likely would reject all government aid pro-
grams. Some evangelical groups might accept funding to support the
operation of soup kitchens while rejecting aid to support child-care
centers for working moms. Far from rare, every religious group in the
country would fall somewhere on this continuum of participation un-
der any neutrality scheme, and where those religious institutions fall
on this continuum would determine the level of government subsidi-
zation of the services they provide. Churches whose doctrine permits
extensive participation in government programs have at the very least
a financial advantage over those whose faith communities that deny
such participation. The point of this construct is to illustrate that par-
ticipation in the system of government subsidization of religion under
the auspices of the neutrality principle is heavily conditioned by the
traditions of participant faiths and that the continuum envisioned
here includes all churches and undoubtedly would result in a very
definite and ordered system of discrimination.
95 See Rebecca G. Rees, "If We Recant, Would We Qualify F".. Exclusion of Religious Providers
from State Social Service Voucher Programs„ 56 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1291, 1313-14 (1999).
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Before one dismisses the discrimination in such programs as
"voluntary," we still must ask, is it uncoerced? All institutions in the
United States, including the religious, have an intense interest in their
own survival. Programs distributing aid under the neutrality principle
offer financial inducements for religious groups to participate in cer-
tain programs that "government" desires for the nation and that may
or may not conflict with certain tenets of the nation's faith communi-
ties.96 These programs easily can be seen to tempt religious groups to
go against their basic principles in order to secure government fund-
ing and receive the same benefits of other faith traditions. The key
here is that not all issues addressed by such programs will fall into the
black and white categories that might be associated with abortion or
similar issues. It will be those programs that center on social issues
more "in the gray" respecting a faith community's belief system that
will begin the erosion, or perhaps more accurately the assimilation, of
our nation's religious traditions. Consider the evangelical community
that falls in the middle of this hypothetical continuum of participa-
tion and believes that a woman's role is in the home and not in the
workplace; therefore, it rejects participation in the child-care program
for working moms. However, this community is not impervious to the
larger society and its leaders recognize that there are working moth-
ers among its membership. The community also recognizes that many
other churches do participate in this program and receive govern-
ment subsidies for their participation. Does the very existence of the
government aid program for working mothers not provide a financial
incentive to this evangelical community to drift away from its doc-
trinal position on the role of women in the family? If the community
chooses to participate after buckling to popular pressure and the gov-
ernment-supplied financial incentive, will it later even remember its
original position on this issue? Consider the possibility of dozens,
perhaps hundreds, of government-aid-to-religion programs involving
many of the nation's faith traditions projected out over a few decades.
One might easily predict the homogenization of America's diverse
faith traditions into a form of civil religion that encourages a malle-
ability of doctrine shaped by the designs of government programs.
And, one must remember Justice Thomas's ominous statement that
"the religious nature of a recipient should not matter to the constitu-
96 See, e.g., Julie B. Kaplan, Military Mirrors on the Wall: Nonestablishrnent and the Military
Chaplaincy, 95 YALE 1.4 1210, 1229-30 (1986).
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tional analysis, so long as the recipient adequately furthers the gov-
ernment's secular purpose."97
Public resources inevitably will flow to those programs that are
popularly affirmed by a majority of the nation to the exclusion of mi-
nority faiths. The public never will accept the "nondiscriminatory"
allocation of funds to some groups, such as a "Branch Davidian Child
Abuse Center" or a program to aid the development of Buddhist mis-
sions in the inner cities. It will be those causes that tend toward the
center, are uncontroversial, and that receive the greatest popular sup-
port that will obtain the lion's share of funding from government
agencies. Lost in the shuffle will be those social issues of importance
to minority religions and those that have little popular appeal. The
result will be substantial funding of programs that attract participa-
tion by "acceptable" religions with minority groups left out, an inher-
ently discriminatory situation.
III. AFTER MITCHELL V. HELMS: COMPLEXITY,
CONFUSION, AND CONFLICT
Beyond the reordering of discrimination and the potential
growth in doctrinal plasticity among American religious communities,
advocates of neutrality like that advanced in Mitchell v. Helms rarely
consider the enormous complexities and potential for conflict that
such programs engender.98
 An example of this complexity is reflected
in a statement from Justice Brennan's opinion in Lemon v. Kurtzman
that "when a sectarian institution accepts state financial aid it be-
comes obligated under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment not to discriminate in admissions policies and faculty
selection."88
 Religious schools applying for government aid adminis-
tered under the neutrality principle doubtless will wish to retain their
current hiring practices. What will happen when a Muslim teacher
applies for a teaching position at a Jewish school and is denied em-
ployment because of her religion, especially when the applicant real-
izes that her tax money is helping to provide computers, books and
other materials to the school? Certain justices have attempted to per-
suade us that these religious schools will be able to retain their auton-
omy in the face of such potential legal challenges. Yet, such assur-
ances are of little value in the increasingly litigious maze of American
97
 Helms, 530 U.S. at 827.
" See 530 U.S. 793, 801-36 (2000).
" 403 U.S. 602, 651 (1971).
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society. What about the student whose application to a religious
school is rejected for the same reason and whose parents come to re-
alize that their tax money now subsidizes certain "secular" functions
of the school that rejects their child? Or perhaps a school that accepts
government aid through one or more programs governed by the neu-
trality principle even though its teachers do not meet government
certification standards and its students consistently fail to meet mini-
mum standards on college entrance exams? Does the government in-
tervene in such a case to ensure a proper return on its investment?
Will the public demand such intervention? If the government does
demand accountability, will the school be able to defend its policies
and practices using the First Amendment or will it be forced to acqui-
esce to the government's will and/or popular opinion? This will in-
deed lead to many challenges as programs expand under the sole
guidance of the principles of neutrality and private choice. Complex-
ity will arise because such programs can never be purely neutral and
because Helms expanded private choice to include institutional rather
than purely individual choice.m
The plurality's application of formal neutrality suggests that
judgments will not be applied or that only minimal judgments will be
applied to the doctrine or ideology of groups in determining their
eligibility for government aid. 101 Inevitably, however, there will exist
some criteria by which religious groups will be forced to qualify for
aid as citizens demand accountability for their public funds. If a Wic-
can school or a religious school that espouses racism as religious doc-
trine were to receive aid under a program whose funds were distrib-
uted on a "neutral" basis, members of the public undoubtedly would
challenge such disbursements much as they now challenge govern-
ment aid to the National Endowment for the Arts for funding exhibits
that are perceived as detrimental to public morality. Were such a chal-
lenge ultimately to end up before the Supreme Court, it would have
the opportunity to tangibly display its "neutrality." 102 The Employment
Division v. Smith case serves as something of a barometer as to how the
Court might rule when such challenges to the neutral disbursement
of aid occur. 103 In Smith, the Court determined that Oregon state law
provided the necessary and sufficient neutral ground for judgments
on the doctrine and practices of religious groups in determining that
100 See 530 U.S. at 809-14.
101 See id.
102 See a
103 See generally 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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persons using peyote in Native American ceremonies may suffer gov-
ernment perialties. 104
 Peyote use violated state narcotic laws and its
use in religious ceremonies did not exempt it from such law accord-
ing to the courts.'" However, many states have laws prohibiting distri-
bution of alcohol to minors, which would make illegal the distribution
of sacramental wine to minors in Catholic, Jewish, and other religious
ceremonies. Yet, the Justices contributing to the majority opinion in
Smith made no reference to possible implications for the religious
practices of majority faiths that also violate state laws.'" The implica-
tion of the Smith case for government aid-to-religion programs is that
minority faiths will discover that their practices are unacceptable only
if and when they seek to participate.'" Yet, the larger point is that the
plurality in Helms believes it has constructed a common sense neutral-
ity criteria for application in government-aid-to-religion cases that is
nondiscriminatory while ignoring the overtly majoritarian elements of
that neutrality.'"
Given the outcome in Smith, it is likely that government will find
ways to restrict funding to groups like Wiccans, snake-handling Chris-
tian sects, Scientologists, Krishnas, and other minority religions for
the very reason that the public will demand it. Will the public stom-
ach government support even of secular functions in schools that also
teach the traditions of witchcraft, or Rastafarianism, or Zoroastrian-
ism, or the Branch Davidians? Again, this system of neutrality will pre-
sent critical choices as legal challenges inevitably arise. If the courts
rule in favor of minority groups and allow them to participate in gov-
ernment programs while concurrently attempting to preserve their
autonomy in belief and practice, the potential for social conflict is
great. A minor example of this was observed at a recent Dallas, Texas
city council meeting to which a Wiccan priest was invited to lead the
I" Id. at 874,890.
105 Id.
106 See generally id. at 872. In fact, many states do exempt religious rituals from state laws
prohibiting the provision of alcohol to minors. However, these exemptions support justice
Scalia's concern in Smith: the necessity of creating positive exemptions in law to allow for
specific religious practices, See id. at 878-79. The problem is that the Supreme Court ap-
pears content that such exemptions are in place to accommodate the majority faiths and it
is unwilling to extend legal exemptions to minority religions, reflecting the current ma-
joritarian mood of the Court.
167 See Gary .J. Shnson, Endangering Religious Liberty, 84 CAL L. REP. 441,492 (1996) (re-
viewing jEssE H. CHOPER, SECURING RELIGIOUS LIBERTY: PRINCIPLES FOR JUDICIAL INTER-
PRETATION OF THE RELIGION CLAUSES (1 995)).
100 See Helms, 530 U.S. at 801-36.
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opening prayer.m Several audience members protested the prayer
and one Christian man had to be physically restrained and led from
the building when he attempted to "shout down" the Wiccan priest.n°
If a Wiccan prayer at a public event can generate such hostility, one
can only suppose that the public's recognition that it is being forced
to subsidize a Wiccan school could precipitate a similar if not more
extreme response. Government-sanctioned discrimination is the more
likely outcome, however. Can one honestly imagine the Supreme
Court upholding the legitimacy of state aid to a religious school that
advocates certain neo-Nazi beliefs such as the extermination of
Jews?In Yet, how can the Court reject the participation of such a
group in a program offered under the neutrality principle when
merely holding such beliefs is not illegal?
The Supreme Court's almost exclusive reliance on the neutrality
principle in conjunction with its radically broadened conception of
"private choice" will enable substantial funding of private religious
schools through government aid.n 2 Yet, there must certainly exist a
level at which these institutions will begin to lose their religious iden-
tities and assume more secular ones based upon the level of public
funding. Again, an understanding of the machinations of bureaucracy
suggest this to be so; yet, tangible evidence already exists in American
history that similar shifts in the funding of religious institutions have
resulted in the eventual loss of religious identity. 113 In The Soul of the
American University, George Marsden chronicles forces that reshaped
the nation's university system from a complex of sectarian colleges
established as part of a "religious-cultural vision" to the largely secular
system of today. 114 One of those forces was a monetary incentive pro-
vided by one of the largest benefactors of American universities, the
Carnegie Foundation, in the early twentieth century to schools in ex-
change for them dropping their denominational identities.n 5 Some
109 Jacquielynn Floyd, Why All the Intolerance, Pray TellT, DALLAS MORNING NEWS„ Oct.
5, 2000, at 29A, available at 2000 WL 28108330.
no Id.
in Bob Jones University u United States demonstrates how the Court might rule in cases
where government aid is made contingent on the conformity of religious belief and prac-
tice to public morality. See 461 U.S. 574, 602-05 (1983). In that case, the Supreme Court
held that the IRS could deny tax-exempt status to the university because of its racially dis-
criminatory admissions policies, even though the school contended that those policies
were rooted in deeply and sincerely held religious beliefs. Id. at 602-05.
112 See Helms, 530 U.S. at 809-14.
113 See generally GEORGE M. MARSDEN, THI SOUL OF THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY (1994).
114 See generally id.
ns Id. at 257.
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schools found the temptation irresistible and opted to drop their re-
ligious associations. Marsden suggests that funding constraints were a
critical factor in reshaping the American university system such that
students today attending schools like Harvard University, the Univer-
sity of Chicago, and Stanford University are rarely cognizant of the
original religious affiliations of those institutions. Is it not possible
that the same fading of religious identity could occur over time to
primary and secondary religious schools as participation in govern-
ment-funded programs increases?
IV. NEUTRALITY AND THE MORPHING OF THE CHURCH INTO A
SECULAR SERVICE ORGANIZATION
A primary criticism of the neutrality principle offered in this Ar-
ticle has been that, in practical terms, neutral disbursements of public
aid to religious institutions cannot remain purely neutral.'" Some cri-
teria must exist by which government agencies determine their
beneficiaries; however, establishing a minimal qualification that sim-
ply verifies that the practices of recipients conform to law will not pre-
vent conflict over the nature of groups receiving aid. As an analogy,
one can look to the social conflict resulting from attempts to imple-
ment programs offering publicly funded abortion services.'" Al-
though abortion is a legal practice under the Constitution, religious
groups throughout the country have protested such programs on the
grounds that they force individuals who consider abortion to be im-
moral to fund this practice. 118 Certain churches have advocated civil
disobedience in efforts to prevent this perceived form of government
coercion; and, in some cases, individual Christians have resorted to
violent acts directed at publicly funded abortion clinics.'" One may
also look to the decision in Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of
Hialeah to see the potential for conflict.'" In 1993, the Supreme
Court there determined that the city council of Hialeah, Florida had
improperly established ordinances to restrict the animal sacrifice
practices of the Santeria religion, responding to public concerns that
these practices were "inconsistent with public morals, peace or
116 See supra notes 98-115 and accompanying text.
I" See Peter Steinfels, The Health Care Debate: The Catholic Church; Bishops Enter Health
Battle with a Warning on Abortion,N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at Al.
118 see id.
119 See, e.g., David Sapsted, Explosion at Abortion Clinic Kills Policeman, DAILY TELEGRAPH,
Jan. 30, 1998, at 16.
1" See 508 U.S. 520, 526 (1993).
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safety."121 The Court found that the ordinances were unconstitutional
in targeting the practices of a particular church and it overturned the
court of appeals ruling that upheld them. 122 Given the Court's deci-
sion in this case, is the government not obligated to allow this church
or any of its affiliates such as a school to participate in programs ad-
ministered under the neutrality principle? 123 How might the public
react to the realization that it is helping to fund certain functions of a
church that practices animal sacrifice? The argument here is that by
again forcing the public to fund religious schools or other institutions
that may or may not adhere to beliefs and practices consistent with
those of the larger society, an inherently contentious situation is cre-
ated.
Scholars have sought to shape the nature of neutrality such that it
supports the administration of programs that are truly neutral and yet
less susceptible to frictions arising between the free exercise of relig-
ious groups and the values of the larger society. 124 Stephen Monsma's
conception of "substantive neutrality" attempts to add greater depth
to the neutrality principle and to provide an alternative to the Court's
"formal neutrality" that denies the need to acknowledge the religious
identities of parties in First Amendment adjudication. 125 This is neces-
sary because the Court's use of formal neutrality has resulted in deci-
sions like Smith where, as Professor Monsma observes, "special protec-
tions for religious minorities are not mandated by the First
Amendment. [The Court] has held that as long as regulatory policies
of general application do not single out religious groups for discrimi-
natory treatment, the Free Exercise Clause does not require special
protections for the practices of religious groups." 126 Thus, the Smith
decision was the logical consequence of the Court's application of its
"formal neutrality" concurrent with its loosening of limitations on
government establishment. 127 Professor Monsma's conception of sub-
stantive neutrality is a more thoughtful accommodationist standard
than the Court's current neutrality principle and is, therefore, deserv-
ing of consideration.'"
121 M. at 526.
10
 Id. at 542.
IRS See id
124 See, e.g., Stephen V. Monsma, Substantive Neutrality as a Basis for Free Exercise-No Estab-
lishment Common Ground, 42 J. CHURCH & ST. 19 (2000).
128 See id. at 25-35.
128 Id. at 23-24.
127 See id. at 24.
128 See id, at 25-35.
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To begin, "substantive neutrality" differs from the Court's appli-
cation of formal neutrality in the sense that substantive neutrality is
concerned with the effect of government action rather than its mere
intent.'" According to Monsma, substantive neutrality asks "whether
the challenged government action has the effect of creating either in-
centives or disincentives for persons to follow their sincere religious
beliefs."'" This is a nice beginning because it immediately relieves the
offense of the Smith decision. ] ' In that case, the state's passage of a
law that made illegal the use of the hallucinogenic drug peyote with-
out providing an exemption for its religious use had the effect of creat-
ing a disincentive to religious practice by threatening the arrest of
persons who participate in this practice. 132 The government's action,
therefore, would have been found unconstitutional using the substan-
tive neutrality principle.'" Substantive neutrality then at the very least
eliminates the lax superficiality of formal neutrality by determining
that government has a responsibility to assess the effects of its ac-
tions. 134
 Presumably, use of this principle would have expanded con-
stitutional inquiry in the Mitchell v. Helms case as well in that substan-
tive neutrality would have required that a determination be made as
to whether aid under the Chapter 2 program had the effect of provid-
ing incentives or disincentives to religious practice.'" While the
Court's decision in Helms under substantive neutrality might well be
the same, the greater depth of substantive neutrality could potentially
lead to a resurrection of the divertibility test, for example, because the
effect of government aid could not be fairly determined without an
assessment of the ultimate disposition of that aid.136
So, if substantive neutrality can help prevent discrimination
against religious groups in their provision of social services while pro-
viding greater protections of religious liberty, why is it not superior to
both the formal neutrality now espoused by the Supreme Court and
the separationist principles developed in prior Court decisions?'" In
the case of the former, it is agreed that substantive neutrality is supe-
129 See Monsma, supra note 124, at 27.
136 Id.
131 See Emp. Div., Dep't of Human Res. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-79 (1990).
1" See id.
133 Monsma, supra note 124, at 29. This conclusion is Professor Monsma's and not this
author's. See id.
lm See id. at 27.
115 See id.
136 See id.
137
 Sty id. at 29.
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rior to the Court's formal neutrality as applied in Helms." However,
substantive neutrality still suffers from certain deficiencies vis-à-vis
separation that have to do with the determination of the nature of
services provided by religious groups, the classification of such
groups, and how such decisions are made. 159 As will be seen, these
functions are critical to preservation of the autonomy of religious
groups and to preservation of the rights given such groups under the
First Arnendment.m
One of the critical provisions of Professor Monsma's substantive
neutrality is that it "includes secularly based systems of belief under
the scope of the First Amendment's freedom of religion provisions.
To favor religious systems of belief over secular systems of belief, or
vice versa, would be a violation of governmental religious neutral-
ity."141 However, a caveat is added such that not just any secular system
is included but rather only "secular belief structures that serve as
functional equivalents in the lives of their adherents as religious belief
structures do in the lives of the devout." 142 Three criteria are intro-
duced under substantive neutrality in the determination that a secular
"belief system" should be granted protections under the First
Amendment with regard to those beliefs, that: "(1) they are sincerely
held over a period of time; (2) they play an integrative or overarching
role in one's life; and (3) they involve one in some sort of communal
or shared experiences."143 These criteria extend greatly the reach of
First Amendment protections to groups of all Idnds. 144 A non-profit
organization, for example, that exists to provide aid to children in
developing countries easily can be seen to meet the criteria above. It
would require only that the proprietors sincerely believe over a period
of time that their purpose in life is to aid poor children in underde-
veloped countries. 145 The communal experience requirement is met
simply through interaction with the children themselves. 146
Yet, this greater inclusiveness that offers First Amendment pro-
tections to secular organizations in the interest of nondiscrimination
will have a corrosive effect over time in society's understanding of
"a See 530 U.S. 793,809-14 (2000).
139 See Mons ►a, supra note 124, at 25-35.
140 See infra notes 141-178 and accompanying text.
141 Monsma, supra note 124, at 28.
"2 Id. at 29.
143 ird.
144 see
 a
I* See id.
146 See Monstna, supra note 124, at 29.
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what is religious. Worse, in the context of government aid programs,
will it not be government agencies that determine recipients and
thereby become the ultimate arbiters of what are sincerely held beliefs
worthy of First Amendment protections? Even if government pro-
grams could be purely neutral regarding their recipients (as has been
challenged above), the result would be the gradual assimilation of
secular and religious groups providing social services into one indis-
tinguishable whole. The continued association of religious and secu-
lar institutions as categorized by government agencies will lead to
simplistic associations in the mind of the public and the loss of relig-
ious identity of sectarian organizations.
Professor Monsma provides a hint of this possibility in his deter-
mination that "the Supreme Court got it right in the Rosenberger v. Rec-
tor & Visitors of the University of Virginia case."147 In Rosenberger, the
Court determined that a religious group at the University of Virginia
had the same right as secular groups to be subsidized by the university
(with student activity fees) in its publications.148
 Monsma states that
"[o]nce the University made the decision to fund student publica-
tions, it could not single out religiously based publications for the
handicap or disadvantage of no-funding."149
 Yet, again what is missed
in this attempt to eliminate perceived discrimination is what James
Madison and other founders recognized was essential to preservation
of the identity and autonomy of religious groups in this country.00
 In
his famous Memorial and Remonstrance, Madison states that religion
must remain beyond the "cognizance" of civil government, not merely
neutral in its eyes.im This statement is no mere hyperbole but rather
the recognition of a critical subtlety in church-state relations that is
being lost in the United States today. Once government becomes
"cognizant" of religion and begins to treat it neutrally, it inevitably
begins the transformation of religious institutions into "one among
many" similar organizations by using its authority to functionally asso-
ciate religious and secular groups in the same categories. In reflecting
on Rosenberger, one observes that the religion clauses of the First
147 Id. at 30; see also Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819
(1995).
I" 515 U.S. at 844-46.
149
 Monsnia, supra note 124, at 30.
159 See, e.g., Ashby D. Boyle II, Fear and Tlembling at the Court: Dimensions of Understanding
in the Supnnne Court's Religion Jurisprudence, 3 Srron HALL CONST. L.J. 55, 90 (1993).
151
 See, e.g., Vincent Blasi, School Vouchers and Religious Liberty: Seven Questions from Madi-
son's Memorial and Remonstrance, 87 CoaNzu. L. Rev. 783, 789 (2002).
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Amendment are unnecessary to decide the case at alL 152 The freedom
of speech provision would suffice to enable government subsidization
of the publications of religious groups alongside secular organiza-
dons. 155 The religion clauses exist for an entirely separate purpose—
to ensure that religion retains its sacred space in our society that per-
haps even the founders realized would be challenged by the en-
croachments of liberalism and modernism. 154
The danger posed by the concept of substantive neutrality is that
religious groups will become nondescript members of a social service
organization class vying for governmental aid along with their "secular
equivalents."155 Church-state separation, by contrast, ensures the iden-
tity of religious groups as religious so long as "they" choose to identify
themselves in that way. 155 No external authority compares them to
supposed secular equivalents in identifying potential participants in
government programs. Under separation, there is no need for gov-
ernmental oversight or audit of religious organizations, nor is there
the temptation of religious groups to stray from doctrine in order to
qualify for government subsidization 1 57 And, as has been demon-
152 See Luba L. Shur, Content-Based Distinctions in a University Funding System and the Ir-
relevance of the Establishment Clause: Putting Wide Awake to Rest, 81 VA. L. REV. 1665, 1678
(1995).
155 see id.
154 Lack of recognition of this critical subtlety also can be noted in the arguments of
those accommodationists who contend that the Establishment Clause intended only that a
single religion not be established by the state. This argument is easily refuted by the his-
torical facts of American constitutional development. The Hamilton Plan submitted on
June 18, 1787, for maniple, clearly states that "[n] or shall any Religious Sect, or denomi-
nation, or religious test for any office or place, be ever established by law." 3 THE RECORDS
OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 628 (Max Farrand ed., 1966). In fact, four of the
eleven First Amendment proposals that went before the House of Representatives between
July 28, 1789 and August 25, 1789 contained wording that barred only the establishment of
a national religion or certain religions over others. Two versions included the wording that
"[fi]o religion shall be established;" one stated that "[n] o religious doctrine shall be estab-
lished;" and another began "[n] o national religion shall be established ...." See id. Had the
Garners desired only that no single religion be established by the state, they had ample
opportunity to select an amendment that reflected that position. They most assuredly had
more in mind, however, because of their recognition of what such a lesser prohibition on
government establishment would mean to the society. Madison particularly recognized
that the interaction of political and religious institutions invariably leads to the intermix-
ing of values and a collusive union favoring the consolidation of power and denying indi-
vidual conscience. See id.
1" See, e.g., Thomas C. Berg, Religious Liberty in America at the End of the Century, 16 J.L.
& RELIGION 187, 191 (2001).
156 See id.
in See, e.g., Ira C. Lupu, Government Messages and Government Money: Santa Fe, Mitchell u
Helms, and the Arc of the Establishment Clause, 42 WM. & MARY L REV. 771, 820 (2001).
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strated, the supposed discrimination of separationism is only reor-
dered under any system of neutrality, not eliminated. Ironically, the
plurality opinion in Helms creates a situation where government is ob-
ligated to support certain religious groups that might not be self-
sustaining in the free market of ideas because it must fund all groups
without respect to doctrine or ideology.'" This grants to faith groups
that are receptive to government subsidy something of an entitlement
in their provision of social services that are supported by government
programs—an improper entitlement under the American constitu-
tional system. Government has the responsibility to protect minority
ideas and the ability of proponents to articulate them, but it should
not influence the degree of pluralism in society by subsidizing relig-
iously or ideologically based groups, even if it claims to do so in a neu-
tral fashion.
The potential damage done to American religion by systems of
neutrality in the interest of simply reordering what inherently will be
inequitable is a far greater price than can ever be justified by its mar-
ginal benefit. Many entrepreneurs in American society will testify that
the cost of involvement in government programs designed to "aid"
their businesses is simply not worth the benefits received. 159 Govern-
ment bureaucrats are harshly criticized as the bane of the free enter-
prise system, and it is illogical to conclude that those same officials
can function more effectively in dealings with religious groups while
juggling the additional complexity of First Amendment limitations.'"
These obvious contradictions demonstrate the desperation of those
who insist that government-aided religion is the cure for the nation's
supposed malaise.
V. NEUTRALITY AND THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN SOCIETY:
THE EUROPEAN MODEL
Recent political and judicial changes in the United States por-
tend a future where church-state partnerships administered under the
auspices of neutrality are likely to burgeon. The hotly contested elec-
tion of George W. Bush as the forty-third president of the United
States and the likelihood that the new president will be required to
158 530 U.S. at 801-36.
159 See, e.g., Stephen llegarty, Voucher Complaints Chase Pair, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES
(Florida), Apr. 7, 2002, at 113,
um See, e.g., Charlton Heston Steers His Chariot Against British Council Bureaucrats, THE
GUARDIAN (London), July 4, 1994, at 6.
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make at least one Supreme Court nomination during his administra-
tion are ominous signs that the country may soon change in a funda-
mental way. 161 Bush's support of school vouchers and Charitable
Choice and his past appointment of conservative justices in Texas
suggest that the balance of power in the Supreme Court soon will shift
decidedly in favor of church-state partnerships and an expanded use
of formal neutrality in deciding government-aid-to-religion cases. 162 It
is reasonable then to consider the potential ramifications of this past
election to the restructuring of the traditional American church-state
relationship and the reshaping of the American ethos.
Anyone reading the plurality opinion in Mitchell v. Helms and
speculating on the likely church-state views of any potential Bush ap-
pointee to the Supreme Court can only come to the conclusion that
today's plurality will become tomorrow's majority. 163 The omen from
Justice Souter's dissenting opinion in Helms is clear: "there is no mis-
taking the abandonment of doctrine that would occur if the plurality
were to become a majority."164 And, one must remember that the plu-
rality in Helms advocated the more offensive formal neutrality rather
than the substantive neutrality advanced by Stephen Monsma that is
more sensitive to the free exercise rights of religious minorities.' 65
Given the number of school voucher programs on state legislative
dockets throughout the nation, the advocates of Charitable Choice
programs in the United States Congress and other factors, there can
be little doubt that church and state are soon to be joined at the hip
in our culture. What will this mean for American society, and how
might we predict cultural changes resulting from recent American
political decisions? To assess the potential changes, it is appropriate to
examine existing countries that are close to the United States in terms
of their industrialization and demographic composition, yet founded
on church-state principles that enable the neutral treatment of relig-
ious institutions by government.
Proponents of neutrality often put forward their alternative to
church-state separation as a new model in social theory. In fact, how-
ever, the neutral treatment of religion by government has been a
161 See, e.g., Joan Biskupic, Who 's Next for the Court? Election May Decide Who Gets to Name
Up to 3 New Justices, USA TODAY, Sept. 28, 2000, at 1A.
162 See, e.g., Ann McFeatters, Values at the Root of Gore-Bush Split, Prrr. Poss-GAZETTE,
Oct. 8, 2000, at A20; Litmus Tests, WASH. POST, June 16, 1999, at A36.
162 530 U.S. 793, 801-36 (2000).
164 Id. at 911 (Souter, J., dissenting).
165 See id. at 809-14.
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standard social construct of many European countries for centuries,
extending back to the Treaty of Augsburg in 1555, the Edict of Nantes
in 1598, and other "religious rights" documents that legitimized faiths
outside the Roman Catholic tradition. 166
 If neutrality is indeed good
for religion and considering its well-established tradition in Europe,
we should be able to identify one or more European countries that
exhibit a thriving religiosity based on this church-state model. The
European continent also offers a sampling of countries that are close
to the United States in terms of their religious pluralism and liberal
political institutions; the essential differentiator is that most are struc-
tured on principles of church-state accommodation. 167 Therefore,
European societies offer perhaps the best examples of where Ameri-
can society is headed religiously if it continues down the path of neu-
tral treatment.
A statistical comparison of European and American religion re-
veals some quite startling contrasts. Poll results from 1994 revealed
that 44 percent of the American people attend at least one church
service per week as compared to 10 percent in France, 14 percent in
Great Britain and 18 percent in the former West Germany.'" A full 82
percent of Americans described themselves as "religious," compared
to 48 percent in France, 54 percent in West Germany, and 55 percent
in Great Britain.'" It is not only the statistics but the statistical
"trends" of European religiosity that demonstrate significant dissimi-
larities from American indicators of religious adherence. In the Neth-
erlands, for example, between 1959 and 1986 the percentage of Ro-
man Catholics among the general population dropped from 37 to 31
percent, the percentage professing membership in the two largest Re-
formed denominations dropped from 38 to 21 percent, and those
stating "no religious preference" climbed from 21 to 44 percent. 17°
England demonstrates a similar trend where the "rate of active church
membership" between 1970 and 1990 dropped from 22 percent to 11
166 See, e.g., ,Richard Hooker, Discovery and Reformation: The Wars of Religion, avail-
able at http://www.wsu.edu/—dee/REFORM/WARS.HTM (1996).
167
 In a multitude of European nations, neutrality principles are applied to make avail-
able government money to private religious schools, church-sponsored social programs,
and a range of other religious-based services. See generally STEPHEN V. MONSIVIA &J. CHRIS-
TOPHER SOPER, THE CHALLENGE OF PLURALISM: CHURCH AND STATE IN FIVE DEMOCRACIES
(1997).
10 Id. at 17.
159 Id
170 Id. at 53.
1066	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:1035
percent."' One researcher summarized neatly the differences be-
tween American religiosity and that of most of the rest of the industri-
alized world by stating, "By just about every measure that survey re-
searchers have conceived and employed, the United States appears
markedly more religious than its peers in the family of nations, the
other industrial democracies."172
Not coincidentally, many of the statistics cited here that attempt
to represent national religiosity carne from The Challenge of Pluralism:
Church and State in Five Democracies, by Stephen Monsma and J. Chris-
topher Soper. 173 The book provides an insightful evaluation of
church-state policy across fives industrialized countries: the United
States, the Netherlands, Australia, Great Britain, and Germany. 174 Yet,
the statistics contained in this book seem to lend support to the sepa-
rationist cause by reflecting the anemic status of religion in the ac-
commodationist countries relative to the United States. 175 Do we not
risk a similar decline in religiosity by adapting the same neutrality
principle that has characterized much of Europe for decades, even
centuries? Might it be true that the dynamism and vitality of religion
in America is attributable to the separation principle? Is it not true
that Americans voluntarily support their religious institutions because
government fails to do it for them? Monsma and Soper acknowledge
this seeming contradiction in their conclusion and they explore the
theories of Roger Finke, Rodney Stark, and Laurence Iannoccone
that contend that an American climate of vigorous competition
among religious groups inspires the uniquely American spritual vital-
ity. 176 However, Monsma and Soper determine that separation is not
unique as a religiously invigorating form of church-state policy
through its impacts on religious competition:
We see no reason to conclude, however, that a policy of strict
church-state separation is the only one that would facilitate
competition among the churches. Our proposal would not
inhibit competition or make America more like its European
counterparts in terms of religious vitality. Our policy calls for
the elimination of any state-imposed monopoly—religious or
171 Id. at 122. Active church membership was described in this survey as attending
church once or more per week. Id.
173 MONSMA & SOPER, supra note 167, at 17.
173 See generally id
174 See generally id.
173 See generally id.
no See generally id.
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secular—that is discriminatory among ideological perspec-
tives . 	 . 177
There can be no question, however, that an American church-
state system that abandons separation in favor of any form of neutral-
ity necessarily becomes more like European models by the mere fact
that government would subsidize certain activities of the American
churches.'" If government subsidization of religious activities can
contribute to a loss of spiritual vitality in the same way that political
conservatives perceive government subsidy often contributes to a loss
of entrepreneurial vitality in the economy, then the conclusion of
Monsma and Soper is doubtful.'" The more serious question is the
matter of degree, for it is likely that the degree to which government
programs influence American religious vitality will depend on their
pervasiveness. Where is the logical point at which to cap the govern-
ment subsidization of religion? Will only religious schools be subsi-
dized under the new system of neutrality and by what legal means can
government be so limited? What about religious missions and soup
kitchens, homes for unwed mothers, drug abuse rehabilitation cen-
ters, care programs for the aged, and so on? By what means can the
government or the churches themselves determine that it is proper to
subsidize one of these services but not another? There certainly is no
evidence in other areas of society that government itself can locate
this optimal point of subsidization.
CONCLUSION
It is the futility of this unfolding and drastic alteration to the
American ethos that is most disconcerting. This Article has demon-
strated that the changes that advocates of neutrality—including the
justices of the plurality in Mitchell v. Helms—wish to impose on society .
cannot achieve their stated goal: the "elimination" of discrimination
against religious groups. At best, neutrality will reorder discrimination
such that those religious groups that are more willing to accept gov-
ernment aid will be subsidized to a greater degree than those groups
that are less willing to accept aid. As churches become more depend-
ent on government favor, they work their way up into the hierarchy of
government favoritism. This "incentivizing" not only of dependency
177 MONSMA & SOPER, supra note 167, at 219-21.
178 See id. at 51-82, 121-50, 155-92.
170 See id. at 221.
1068	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:1035
but of conformity to a standard that, in Justice Thomas's words, "ade-
quately furthers the government's secular purpose" only can be harm-
ful to American religious vitality. Religion with its hand out can never
speak with a prophetic voice. It will acquiesce to government re-
quirements in order to insure its continued funding, and it will be-
come more technical in its terminology and more secular in its ideol-
ogy in order to compete with the other organizations with which it is
"classed" by government as providing equivalent social services. Relig-
ious groups with strict prohibitions against institutional cooperation
with government will find themselves at an increasing financial disad-
vantage relative to other faith groups as neutrality-based programs
expand.
Equally disconcerting is the fact that the Court's approval of neu-
trality-based government-aid-to-religion programs is wholly unneces-
sary. Current law enables religious organizations to receive govern-
ment funds for the operation of certain social programs, so long as
those funds are not commingled with funds used to advance their re-
ligious messages. While there is an admitted sacrifice in religious enti-
ties not being able to deliver social services in the context of their re-
ligious motivations for doing so, this arrangement does allow religious
groups to partner with government in administering social services.
Programs administered under the formal neutrality now advanced by
the Helms decision would see limitations on proselytization and relig-
ious advancement disappear, denying the religious liberty of Ameri-
can citizens whose receipt of benefits might be conditioned upon
their willingness to first hear a religious message.
This author makes no pretense of understanding fully the dy-
namics that enables the church-state separation of American culture
to contribute to a religious vitality far superior to the church-state ac-
commodation of European countries, but the evidence is irrefutable.
If we are willing to take a lesson from our European friends, we will
know that government-aid-to-religion is a misnomer—a wolf in
sheep's clothing. Because the essence of religion deals with the sacred
rather than the temporal aspects of humanity, it differs in kind rather
than degree from other aspects of life which government supports.
Recognition of this fact provided the architectural wisdom that con-
tributed to the subtle but ingenious wording of the First Amendment.
Members of the Supreme Court now wish to use a sledgehammer to
reshape that subtle and delicate instrument. And, there is fear that
once that instrument has been reshaped, the sledgehammer will be
the only tool capable of molding it again to whatever coercive pur-
pose that government or even the people desire. If the United States
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adopts a system of neutrality in church-state relations, it will be most
difficult to return to genuine church-state separation even if it is rec-
ognized that neutrality has been harmful to the country's religious
vivacity. Current political difficulties in attempting to lessen the size of
the welfare state testify to this postulate.
Have Americans become so fearful of our ideological diversity
and the country's perceived moral decline that we are willing to place
at risk our religious vitality, perhaps the most distinctive feature of
American society? Our inability to come to agreement on the impor-
tance of our founding principle of church-state separation to the na-
tion's identity and ethos is conditioned by William Lee Miller's obser-
vation that "religious liberty was more central to the nation's original
moral self-definition than is comprehended ... ." 18° The farther we
drift in time from our nation's origin, the greater our disposition to
tweak the system, to attempt to reshape our national ethos using the
coercive power of government. Our nation has looked in the mirror
and, disgusted, has determined that changes must take place. But
what changes? Do we commit to a facelift or to a program of vigorous
exercise? How do we exorcize the demons that supposedly inhabit our
national soul without damaging the very spirit of the nation itself? Are
we willing to settle for official programs designed to promote a civic
religiosity at the likely expense of spiritual vitality? For the political
conservative who laments the damage done to the spirit of the na-
tion's underclass by government-aid programs for the poor, such
questions as these should not seem hyperbolic.
It is offered here that our nation has misdiagnosed the cause of
its malaise. We have determined that the constitutional denial of the
"right" to have government-sponsored generic prayers bellowed out
over faulty PA systems at high-school football games has produced a
generation of hedonists who have no place for God in their lives. And
a similar constitutional denial of government aid to religious schools
only intensifies that belief. In the midst of all this "denial," Americans
are afraid to confront the possibility that our affluence may contrib-
ute to our loss of spiritual vitality and, by consequence, to society's
moral decay. American Christian protests over not having the Ten
Commandments posted on the walls of every schoolhouse cushions
the guilt of parents who acquiesce to the increasing material desires
of their children and fear the ultimate effects that such acquiescence
may have on them. Is it possible that we seek relief from that guilt
ieo MILLER, supra note 25, at 230.
•1070	 Boston College Law Review 	 [Vol. 43:1035
through attempts to have government make us once again a religious
people, initially to begin in our schools but inevitably to encompass
many areas of our society? However, if we sacrifice our nation's
authentic spirituality for a government-sponsored civic faith, we
minimize hopes for future Great Awakenings that might initiate spiri-
tual renewals capable of reforming our increasingly materialistic cul-
ture. Church-state separation has one quality that neutrality or other
forms of accommodation can never eclipse: it denies Americans a
cushy, feel-good religiosity that conforms to the larger norms and val-
,ues of society. Separation demands that we as individuals live our
faiths often over and against the culture and it denies the right of
government to attempt to live our faiths for us. The tradition of
church-state separation is the one true purely American virtue. If we
change it, we change the American ethos and risk jettisoning the core
principle that has made America one of history's greatest achieve-
ments.
